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Publications

Our publications keep professionals informed on the most important developments and issues in health security and biosecurity.

Showing 1 - 20 of 102 results

BWC confidence-building measures: Increasing BWC assurance through transparency and information sharing

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Politics and the Life Sciences
Publication Type
Article

In the absence of a treaty protocol or verification regime, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) instituted confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a mechanism to increase confidence in compliance by enhancing transparency and mitigating ambiguities regarding states parties’ biological activities.

FAR-UV Technology and Germicidal Ultraviolet (GUV) Energy: A Policy and Research Review for Indoor Air Quality and Disease Transmission Control

Publication Type
Article

COVID-19 highlighted the challenges of public acceptance of public health measures, including mask-wearing and vaccination. which has spurred interest in engineered approaches to reduce infections. Germicidal Ultraviolet (GUV) Energy has been used for decades in hospital rooms to limit TB transmission, but it is expensive to install in the upper part of rooms where it may be used safely

Safeguarding Mail-Order DNA Synthesis in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

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Applied Biosafety
Publication Type
Article

Artificial intelligence (AI) tools continue to be developed and used within the life sciences. The impact of these tools on the biosecurity landscape surrounding mail-order DNA synthesis and how to address the impacts have not been critically examined in the literature.

Authors
Stephanie Batalis
Caroline Schuerger
Matthew E. Walsh

Integrating safety, security, sustainability, and social responsibility principles into the U.S. bioeconomy

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mSphere
Publication Type
Article

Bioindustrial manufacturing is undergoing rapid expansion and investment and is seen as integral to nations’ economic progress. Ensuring that bioindustrial manufacturing benefits society as the field expands is of critical, urgent importance. To better understand the industry’s ethical trajectory and to shape policy, we explored the views of biotechnology leaders on four aspects of ethical and social responsibility—safety, security, social responsibility, and sustainability—what we have termed “4S principles.” We identified policy actions governments and other stakeholders may take to maximize societal benefits in industrial biotechnology.

Authors
Aurelia Attal-Juncqua
John Getz
Ryan Morhard

Shaping the future US bioeconomy through safety, security, sustainability, and social responsibility

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Trends in Biotechnology
Publication Type
Editorial

Biomanufacturing practitioners and researchers describe the norms that should govern the growing, global field, to include safety, security, sustainability, and social responsibility. These ‘4S Principles’ should be broadly adopted so that the future of the field may provide the greatest benefits to society.

Authors
Aurelia Attal-Juncqua
Galen Dods
Nicole Crain
James Diggans
David Dodds
Steve Evans
Nick Fackler
Kevin Flyangolts
Kathleen Gibson
Margaret E. Kosal
Aditya Kunjapur
Russ Read
Brian Renda
Corinne D. Scown
Kissaou Tchedre
Krista Ternus
Beth Vitalis

The Model State Indoor Air Quality Act

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JAMA
Publication Type
Article

The Model State Indoor Air Quality Act (MSIAQA)1 developed in collaboration with national advisors adopts science-based regulatory standards, such as testing, enhanced air filtration, system maintenance, and ventilation, to advance the public’s health and increase occupant productivity—ensuring that public indoor environments provide healthy air to breathe.

Authors
Lawrence O. Gostin
James G. Hodge, Jr
Model Clean Indoor Air Act, cover

Model Clean Indoor Air Act

Publication Type
Report

Improving indoor air quality (IAQ) will diminish routine exposure to airborne diseases,1,2 limit outbreaks or epidemics,3 and lower risks of noninfectious respiratory conditions like asthma that affect the health of millions each year.4 Improving IAQ is also cost-effective. Proper ventilation and filtration in crowded public indoor settings can significantly reduce the costs of illness at a benefit-cost ratio ranging from 3:1 to 100:1,5 exceeding similar ratios for most other public health interventions.6

Authors
James G. Hodge, Jr
Erica N. White
Summer Ghaith
Erin Fink
India–United States Track 1.5 Strategic Biosecurity Dialogue, Report from the Ninth Dialogue Session

India–United States Track 1.5 Strategic Biosecurity Dialogue, Report from the Ninth Dialogue Session

Publication Type
Meeting Report

On May 24 and 25, 2023, the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (“the Center”) co-hosted a dialogue (“the dialogue”) with the Regional Centre for Biotechnology of the Department of Biotechnology in the Indian Ministry of Science and Technology, in Washington, DC, to discuss biosecurity issues of importance to both India and the United States. The dialogue aimed to increase knowledge of prevention and response efforts for natural, deliberate, and accidental biological threats in India and the US; share best practices and innovations; examine opportunities for partnership and collaboration; develop and deepen relationships among dialogue participants; and identify issues that should be elevated to the attention of Indian or US government officials.

Authors
Rachael Brown
Andrea Lapp
Sarah Schneider-Firestone

Proposal for a national diagnostics action plan for the United States

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Health Policy OPEN
Publication Type
Article

Providing a definitive diagnostic test in a disease emergency is critical to limit pathogen spread, develop and deploy medical countermeasures, and mitigate the social and economic harms of a serious epidemic. While major accomplishments have accelerated test development, expanded laboratory testing capacity, and established widespread point-of-care testing, the United States does not have a plan to rapidly respond, to develop, manufacture, deploy, and sustain diagnostic testing at a national scale. To address this gap, we are proposing a National Diagnostics Action Plan that describes the steps that are urgently needed to prepare for future infectious disease emergencies, as well as the actions we must take at the first signs of such’ events.

Authors
Sujeet B. Rao
Susan Van Meter
Adam Borden

The Origins of Covid-19 — Why It Matters (and Why It Doesn’t)

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The New England Journal of Medicine
Publication Type
Perspective

When health emergencies arise, scientists seek to discover the cause — such as how a pathogen emerged and spread — because this knowledge can enhance our understanding of risks and strategies for prevention, preparedness, and mitigation. Yet well into the fourth year of the Covid-19 pandemic, intense political and scientific debates about its origins continue. The two major hypotheses are a natural zoonotic spillover, most likely occurring at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, and a laboratory leak from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). It is worth examining the efforts to discover the origins of SARS-CoV-2, the political obstacles, and what the evidence tells us. This evidence can help clarify the virus’s evolutionary path. But regardless of the origins of the virus, there are steps the global community can take to reduce future pandemic threats.

Authors
Lawrence O. Gostin

BWC assurance: increasing certainty in BWC compliance

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The Nonproliferation Review
Publication Type
Article

Following the 2001 end to negotiations on a legally binding protocol, states parties to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) developed entrenched positions about the necessity of treaty verification, hindering progress on treaty aims. The study described in this article was designed to facilitate dialogue on verification-related issues outside the context of those positions, using the term “assurance” to represent the degree of certainty that states parties are meeting their treaty obligations. From August 2020 to July 2021, the researchers conducted 36 interviews—16 with state-party delegations and 20 with independent experts, representing 20 countries. They performed mixed-methods analysis on the interviews, including quantitative metrics on qualitative interview content. Interviewees’ views on verification, compliance, and related concepts varied widely. Future efforts by states parties to achieve common understanding on these topics could facilitate concrete progress. While no single mechanism is sufficient to achieve verification or assess compliance, packages of mechanisms could increase assurance. Interviewees expressed general support for implementing assurance mechanisms, even in the absence of a comprehensive, legally binding protocol or verification regime, even among states parties for which that is the primary goal. Avenues to increase assurance among BWC stakeholders merit further discussion in the current intersessional program.

Improving U.S. Biosafety and Biosecurity: Revisiting Recommendations from the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel and the Fast Track Action Committee on Select Agent Regulations

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Applied Biosafety
Publication Type
Article

In response to a series of biosafety incidents in 2014, the White House directed two high-level expert committees to analyze biosafety and biosecurity in U.S. laboratories and make recommendations for work with select agents and toxins. Overall, they recommended 33 actions to address areas related to national biosafety, including promoting a culture of responsibility, oversight, outreach and education, applied biosafety research, incident reporting, material accountability, inspection processes, regulations and guidelines, and determining the necessary number of high-containment laboratories in the United States.

The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security convened an in-person meeting of experts and practitioners to discuss the US Biosafety & Biosecurity Innovation Initiative

Building Strong Biosafety and Biosecurity into the Expanding US Bioeconomy

Publication Type
Meeting Report

On January 10, 2023, the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security at the Bloomberg School of Public Health convened an in-person, not-for-attribution meeting of experts and practitioners from government, academia, and the private sector to discuss the US Biosafety & Biosecurity Innovation Initiative launched as part of a September 2022 Executive Order titled, “Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation for a Sustainable, Safe, and Secure American Bioeconomy.” The meeting focused on priority actions and efforts needed to enhance biosafety and biosecurity throughout the biotechnology research and development (R&D) and biomanufacturing lifecycles, while maximizing potential societal benefits, as well as safeguarding and boosting US national competitiveness. This report describes discussion on these topics undertaken by the experts who attended the meeting.

 

Authors
Aurelia Attal-Juncqua
Matthew E. Walsh
Cover of the Discussion on the Future Science and  Technology of Biological Attribution; Summary of 6 December 2022 meeting organized by the Office of Science and Technology Policy

Discussion on the Future Science and Technology of Biological Attribution

Publication Type
Meeting Report

After a biological incident—whether it is natural, deliberate, accidental, or undetermined—there is an imperative to investigate and identify the cause of the incident, and attribute who, if anyone, is responsible. The ability to attribute responsibility for a biological incident (bioattribution) helps to ensure that the deliberate use of biological weapons may be fully prosecuted and those responsible are held accountable. Bioattribution capabilities may also serve as a deterrent for use of biological weapons. Such a capability is the result of an attribution investigation that integrates multiple data sources, including information collected by law enforcement and public health officials, intelligence information, and technical information about the biological agent and other biological and environmental samples collected. The process is complicated; it relies on technical methodology and social systems (ie, the ability to get samples and to have a trusted process) to produce the technical information and sampling for attribution. It is important to routinely evaluate the state of the science available for bioattribution to ensure that investigations may leverage state-of-the-art technology and that efforts are being made to overcome technical challenges.

Authors
Matthew E. Walsh

Exploring the value of a global gene drive project registry

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Nature Biotechnology
Publication Type
Letter

Recent calls to establish a global project registry before releasing any gene-drive-modified organisms (GDOs) have suggested a registry could be valuable to coordinate research, collect data to monitor and evaluate potential ecological impacts, and facilitate transparent communication with community stakeholders and the general public. Here, we report the results of a multidisciplinary expert workshop on GDO registries convened on 8–9 December 2020 involving 70 participants from 14 countries. Participants had expertise in gene drive design, conservation and population modeling, social science, stakeholder engagement, governance and regulation, international policy, and vector control; they represented 45 organizations, spanning national and local governmental agencies, international organizations, nonprofit organizations, universities, and district offices overseeing local vector control. The workshop aimed to gather perspectives on a central question: “In what ways could a gene-drive project registry both contribute to and detract from the fair development, testing and use of GDOs?” We specifically queried the perceived purpose of a registry, the information that would need to be included, and the perceived value of a registry. Three primary findings emerged from the discussion: first, many participants agreed a registry could serve a coordinating function for multidisciplinary and multisector work activities; second, doing so may require different design elements, depending on the target end-user group and intended purpose for that group; and third, these different information requirements lead to concerns about information sharing via a registry, suggesting potential obstacles to achieving transparency through such a mechanism. We conclude that any development of a gene-drive project registry requires careful and inclusive deliberation, including with potential end-users, to ensure that registry design is optimal.

Authors
Riley I. Taitingfong
Cynthia Triplett
Váleri N. Vásquez
Ramya M. Rajagopalan
Robyn Raban
Aaron Roberts
Gerard Terradas
Bridget Baumgartner
Claudia Emerson
Fred Gould
Fredros Okumu
Cynthia E. Schairer
Hervé C. Bossin
Leah Buchman
Karl J. Campbell
Anna Clark
Jason Delborne
Kevin M. Esvelt
Joshua Fisher
Robert M. Friedman
et al.
National Strategy for Improving Indoor Air Quality cover

National Strategy for Improving Indoor Air Quality

Publication Type
Meeting Report

The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security hosted a meeting, “National Strategy for Improving Indoor Air Quality,” in Washington, DC, on September 8, 2022. The meeting featured a keynote speaker and four expert panels focused on the importance of indoor air quality (IAQ), challenges to providing healthy indoor air across the United States, international perspectives and strategies for healthy air improvements, and catalyzing needed science and technology innovation in the IAQ field. Dr. Ashish Jha, White House COVID-19 Response Coordinator, opened the meeting by reiterating the importance of IAQ to the Biden-Harris Administration. 

The Biological Weapons Convention should endorse the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct

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Trends in Microbiology
Publication Type
Article

The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists are a set of ten principles designed to promote responsible science and strengthen biosecurity governance. They should be broadly adopted, including being endorsed by the Biological Weapons Convention at its 9th Review Conference in November 2022.

Authors
Leifan Wang
Peter F. McGrath
Yingjin Yuan
M. Iqbal Parker
Weiwen Zhang
Youhai Sun
Yang Xue
Junyan Zhang
Xi Zhang
Liang Yu
Jie Song
Marc Trotochaud
Feasibility of a Health Security Center in Asia Findings from a feasibility study on the benefits and challenges of establishing a new health security center in Asia

Feasibility of a Health Security Center in Asia Findings from a feasibility study on the benefits and challenges of establishing a new health security center in Asia

Publication Type
Report

This study examined the feasibility of creating a new nongovernmental health security research policy center in Asia, how such a center might benefit the advancement of policies promoting health security, and where such a center might be located. Health security policy encompasses numerous aspects of global health, including emerging infectious diseases, epidemics, medical and public health preparedness and response, deliberate and accidental biological threats, risk management related to advanced life science research and other biosecurity issues, and reduction of global catastrophic biological risks (GCBRs). GCBRs are those events in which biological agents—whether naturally emerging or reemerging, deliberately created and released, or laboratory engineered and escaped—could lead to sudden, extraordinary, widespread disaster beyond the collective capability of national and international governments and the private sector to control.1 If unchecked, GCBRs could lead to great suffering, loss of life, and sustained damage to national governments, international relationships, economies, societal stability, or global security.

Authors
Debora Sandiford