Publications

AI-enabled research might cause immense harm if it is used to design pathogens with worrying new properties. To prevent this, we need better collaboration between governments, AI developers and experts in biosafety and biosecurity.

In the absence of a treaty protocol or verification regime, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) instituted confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a mechanism to increase confidence in compliance by enhancing transparency and mitigating ambiguities regarding states parties’ biological activities.

We led the last large-scale exercise conducted by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security before the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite COVID-19, pandemic exercises are more necessary than ever to prevent the loss of hard-fought gains achieved during COVID-19, keep policymakers from assuming all pandemics will be like COVID-19, and encourage continued engagement from policymakers in strengthening health resilience rather than returning to a cycle of panic and neglect.

The slow arrival of vaccines to the increasing number of countries ravaged by mpox shows that the COVID-19 pandemic did not result in the structural change needed to address global inequities. The absence of global arrangements to ensure access to health products during emergencies is a gap that governments are seeking to fill through recently agreed amendments to the International Health Regulations (IHR) and continuing negotiations towards a Pandemic Agreement

COVID-19 highlighted the challenges of public acceptance of public health measures, including mask-wearing and vaccination. which has spurred interest in engineered approaches to reduce infections. Germicidal Ultraviolet (GUV) Energy has been used for decades in hospital rooms to limit TB transmission, but it is expensive to install in the upper part of rooms where it may be used safely

Biological events—including outbreaks and pandemics, biological-weapons use, and accidental laboratory release—have the potential to be extremely disruptive.

Because hospitals are spaces where life and death are routinely at stake, social hierarchies, pressures, and cultural norms are heightened. This was particularly true in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. Examining the dynamics in that era can provide insight into the nature of race and hierarchy in hospital structures.

The Pandemic Recovery Metrics to Drive Equity – PanREMEDY project sought to give form to the least considered phase of a catastrophic outbreak of infectious disease, while applying an equity lens. The project inquired, “By what measures could local and state decision makers know that efforts at holistic recovery were working, especially for the socially vulnerable individuals and communities hit hardest by COVID-19?”

Great benefits to humanity will likely ensue from advances in artificial intelligence (AI) models trained on or capable of meaningfully manipulating substantial quantities of biological data, from speeding up drug and vaccine design to improving crop yields.^1-3 But as with any powerful new technology, such biological models will also pose considerable risks.

A rapidly growing mpox outbreak is heightening concern over a potential multicountry epidemic or even a new pandemic. This year alone, there have been more than 17 000 suspected (2863 confirmed) cases of mpox across the African continent, with the majority in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

In the United States, state, tribal, local, and territorial public health agencies play a vital role in responding to infectious disease outbreaks. One foundational strategy for controlling communicable diseases is case investigation/contact tracing (CI/CT), an approach that has been routinely employed in the United States and global settings to control sexually transmitted infections, tuberculosis, and outbreaks of emerging infections such as Ebola and COVID-19.¹ When effectively implemented at the early stages of an outbreak, CI/CT programs promptly identify cases and their contacts and apply prevention and control measures, thereby preventing onward transmission of disease in communities.¹

The 2024 meeting of the Southeast Asia Strategic Multilateral Biosecurity Dialogue was held in Singapore, with participants from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. The dialogue is conducted at the Track 1.5 level, with current and former government officials—participating in their personal capacity—and civil society experts collaborating to identify priority threats and gaps, share experiences and lessons, and propose opportunities to strengthen national and regional resilience against natural, accidental, and deliberate biological threats. 

The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security convened an in-person, not-for-attribution stakeholder discussion on April 25, 2024, to: 1) examine how reusable respirators (RRs) used at scale would protect against supply chain shocks in large emergencies, cost less per respirator than single-use disposable respirators over the life of the product, and provide better protection for workers; and 2) inform a national strategy to promote stockpiling of RRs by the US government, encourage greater adoption of RRs by the healthcare sector, incentivize innovation in RR design, and create a stronger demand signal for industry.

Mass gatherings include a diverse range of events such as sporting competitions, religious ceremonies, entertainment activities, political rallies and cultural celebrations, which have important implications for population well-being. However, if not managed properly, these events can amplify health risks including those related to communicable diseases, and place undue strain on health systems in host countries and potentially in attendees’ home countries, upon their return.

This checklist is an instrument to help public health departments and communicators improve trust and communication, especially in anticipation of serious public health issues, health emergencies, and when rumors are abundant.

Artificial intelligence (AI) tools continue to be developed and used within the life sciences. The impact of these tools on the biosecurity landscape surrounding mail-order DNA synthesis and how to address the impacts have not been critically examined in the literature.